Natural-rate models suggest that the systematic parts of monetary policy will not have important consequences for the business cycle. Nevertheless, we often observe high and variable rates of monetary growth, and a tendency for monetary authorities to pursue countercyclical policies.
countercyclical monetary behavior with rationality of the policymaker.2 A prinôipal objective of this analysis is to achieve this reconciliation.
The natural-rate models that have appeared in the macroeconomics literature of the last decade share the characteristic that policy choice is over a class of prespecified monetary rules. With the policy rule predetermined, there is no scope for ongoing policymaking; 4iscretionary policy choice is excluded a priori. If private agents can deduce.the characteristics of the monetary process once it is implemented, it defines their expectations. Thus, the policy decision is made subject to the constraint that agents' expectations of future monetary policy will equal the realization. This framework has the advantage of allowing the analysis to be reduced to a pair of single-agent decision problems, which can be considered independently, but excludes consideration of the essentially game-theoretic situation that arises when policy decisions are made on an ongoing basis.
In our framework an equilibrium will include the following features:
(a) a decision rule for private agents, which determines their actions as a function of their current information, b) an expectations function, which determines the expectations of private agents as a function of their current information, and c) a policy rule, which specifies the behavior of policy instruments as a function of the policymaker's current information set.
The outcome is said to be a rational expectations equilibrtum if first,.
the decision rule specified in (a) is optimal for agents given their expectations as calculated under (b), and second, it is optimal for the -3policymaker, whose actions are described by (c), to perform in accordance with agent's expectations (b), given that the policymaker recognizes the form of the private, decision rules under (a). Faced by a maximizing policymaker, it would be unreasonable for agents to maintain expectations from which they know it will be in the policymaker's interest to deviate.
If policy is precommited, the only reasonable expectations that agents can hold are those defined by the rule. But, if policy is sequentially chosen, the equality of policy expectations and realizations is a characteristic of equilibrium--not a prior constraint. The question to be addressed is then what expectations can agents hold that they can reasonably expect to be realized.
The policymaker is viewed as attempting to maximize an objective that reflects "society's" preferences on inflation and unemployment (or output).
(Additional arguments for the preference function are introduced later.)
Although the equilibrium involves a path of unemployment that is invariant with policy, the rational. policymaker adopts an activist rule. The extent of countercyclical response is dictated, among other things, by society's relative dislikes for inflation and unemployment. There is an apparent contradiction because an activist policy is pursued that ends up having no desirable effects--in fact, unemployment is unaltered but inflation ends. up being excessive. This outcome reflects the' assumed inability of the policymaker--that is, of the institutional apparatus that is set up to manage monetary affairs--to precommit its course of future actions.
This feature has been stressed in an important paper by Kydland and Prescott (1977) . If precommitment were feasible through legal arrangements or other -4procedures, the countercyclical aspect of monetary/inflation policy would disappear (and, abstracting from costs of erecting and maintaining institutions, everyone would be better off). When this type of advance restriction is precluded, so that the policymaker sets instruments at each date subject only to the initial conditions prevailing for that date (which do not include restraints on policy choices), the equilibrium may involve an activist form of policy. This solution conforms to optimal behavior of private agents subject to a rationally anticipated policy rule. It corresponds also to optimality for the policymaker each period, subject to agents' decision rules. Although an equilibrium obtains, the results are sub-optimal, relative to outcomes where precommitment is permitted. Given an environment where this type of policy precommitment is absent--as appears to characterize the U.S. and other countries in recent years--the results constitute a positive theory of monetary growth and inflation.
The Model of Unemployment and Inflation
The general results are illustrated by a simple economic model, which is based on an example that was set out by Kydland and Prescott (1977, pp. 477-80) and extended in Gordon (1980) . The unemployment rate U, which is a convenient proxy for the overall state of real activity, equals a "natural rate," U, plus a term that depends negatively on contemporaneously unexpected inflation, -(1)
-5-For convenience, the "Phillips-Curve slope" parameter, a, is treated as a constant.3 Given the relevant inflationary expectations, ir, equation (1) is assumed to reflect the maximizing behavior of private a.gents on decentralized markets. The formulation of is detailed below. Equation (1) 
where is independently, identically distributed with zero mean. If 0 < A c 1 applies, then the realization for c affects future natural unemployment rates in the same direction. For example, for the one_periodT ahead forecast, E(UtIIt1) = AIJ1 + (l-A)U', where denotes date t-l information, which includes the observation of U1. The effect of c on • future natural unemployment rates dissipates gradually over time--equation
(2) implies that the long-run mean of the natural unemployment rate is lim E(U+1IIti) n, a constant. For convenience, U in equation (1) is assumed to depend only on contemporaneously unexpected inflation, and not on lagged values. These additional terms could be introduced without changing the main results (see below).
The policymaker's (and society's) objective for each period is summarized by cost, Z, that depends on that period's values for the unemployment rate and inflation. A simple quadratic form is assumed:
This paper does not consider any divergence across individuals in their assessments of relative costs for unemployment and inflation.
The first term in equation (3) indicates that costs rise with the departure of Ut from a "target" unemployment rate, kU', which depends positively on the contemporaneous natural rate. In the absence of external effects, k = 1 would correspond to an efficiency criterion--that, is, departures of Ut from LJ in either direction would be penalized. In the presence of unemployment compensation, income taxation and the like, U will tend to exceed the efficient level--that is, privately-chosen quantities of marketable output and employment will tend to be too low. The inequality, k c 1, captures this possibility.4 Not surprisingly, k < 1 is a necessary condition for activist policy to arise in the present model.
Governmental decisions on taxes and transfers will generally influence the value of k. However, given that some government expenditures are to be carried out, it will generally be infeasible to select a fiscal policy that avoids all distortions and yields k = 1. We assume that the government's optimization on the fiscal side--which we do not analyze explicitly--results in a value of k that satisfies 0 c k c 1. The choice of monetary policy is then carried out conditional on this value of k.
Equation (3) regards departures of from zero as generating costs. We do not offer explanations here for the sources of these costs due to inflation.
However, the form could be modified to (1r where ir might involve the optimal rate of taxation on cash balances. A later section expands the analysis to consider the revenue from money creation.
The policymaker is assumed to control an instrument--say, monetary growth, Pt__which has a direct connection to inflation, '' in each period This specification neglects any dynamic relation between inflation and monetary growth or a correlation between (iand the real disturbances, -CJ c.1, ... In effect, the analysis is simplified by pretending that the policymaker chooses ir directly in each period. A later section expands the analysis to allow a separation between inflation and monetary growth.
The choice of at each date is designed to minimize the expected present value of costs, as calculated at some starting date 0, t (4) Minimize Z/(l+r) t=l where 10 represents the initial state of information and r is a constant, exogenous real discount rate. It should be stressed that the policymaker's objective conforms with society's preferences.
The determination of inflation and unemployment can be characterized as a "gamet' between the policyinaker and a large number of private-sector agents.
The structure of this game is as follows. The policymaker enters period t with the information set, ttV The inflation rate, ii, is set based on 't-l in order to be consistent with the cost-minimization objective that is set out in equation (4). Simultaneously, each individual formulates expectations, for the .policymaker's choice of inflation for period t. These expectations are assumed to be based on the same information set, 'tl' as that available to the policyinaker. Most importantly, in forming inflationary -8expectations, people incorporate the knowledge that will emerge from the policymaker's cost-minimization problem that is specified in equation (4).
Finally, the choices for and ir, together with the random disturbance, determine and the cost, Z, in accordance with equations (i)--(3).
The Expectations Mechanism
In order to determine ir, agents must consider the policymaker's optimization problem, which determines the choice of irs. Suppose for the moment that the policyinaker when selecting ir treats and all future values of inflationary expectations, Wfi as given. Variations in will affect Ut through the usual Phillips-curve mechanism in equation (1). As the model is set out, this effect would not carry forward to direct effects on future unemployment rates, although this channel of persistence could be incorporated. The current choice of inflation, 1Tt is assumed also to imply no direct.constraints on future policy choices, itt.. Therefore, with current and future inflationary expectations held fixed, the determination of involves only a one-period tradeoff between higher inflation and lower unemployment in accordance with the cost function of equation (3) In the present framework the determination of is divorced from the particular realization of itt. At the start of period t, agents form ir by forecasting the policymaker's "best" action, contingent on the information set, 1t-l The expectation, n, is not conditioned on itself. Therefore, the policymaker (possessed with "free will") faces a choice problem in which is appropriately held fixed while is selected. Further, in formulating ir, the private agents understand that the policymaker is in this position.
The connection between ir and future inflationary expectations, 7r., is less clear. As noted above, the present model allows for no direct connection between (even with ir held fixed) and future "objective" characteristics of the economy. There is also no scope for learning over time about the economy's structure; in particular, ir supplies no additional information about the objective or technology of the policymaker. Accordingly, one would be inclined to search for an equilibrium in which did not depend on "extraneous" past variables, such as ire. However, the severing of a link beween 7r and ir. eliminates some possibly interesting equilibria in which the government can invest in its reputation--that is, in "credibility.t' •The nature of these solutions is discussed later. For present purposes we examine situations in which future expectations, ir., are invariant with Given that future values of Ii and are independent of n, there is no channel for iv to affect future costs, Z .. Therefore, the objective t t+t posed in equation (4) reduces to the one-period problem of selecting tr1 in order to minimize Etllt.
In a solution to the model the public will view the policymaker as setting in accordance with the information set, 't-l' which is available at the start of period t. Suppose that people perceive this process as described by the reaction fimction, he(Il).s Therefore, inflationary expectations--formed on the basis of I 1--would be given by6 (5) = he(I_l).
A solution to the model involves finding a function he(O, such that setting ir = he(Il) is a solution to the policymaker's cost-minimization problem, given that = he(Il). Expecting inflation as specified by he(.) -10must not contradict the policymaker's minimization of expected costs, as set out in equation (3). The previous discussion suggests that lagged values of inflation will not appear as parts of the solution, he(D. That is, we are looking for an equilibrium where = = 0 applies for all i > 0. We also look for a solution where the policymaker understands that iTt is generated from equation (5).
The unemployment rate is determined from equation (1) after substitution for from equation (2) and for from equation (5) 
Given that inflationary expectations for period t are i he(Il), the policymaker will select in order to minimize where Z appears in equation (7). The first-order condition, -CEt_11t) = 0, implies that the chosen inflation rate, denoted by , will satisfy the condition,
The property, E(ctIi) = 0, has been used here. .me second-order condition for a.minimum is satisfied.
Although the policymaker is not constrained to follow the anticipated rule, he(Il), the public is assumed to understand the nature of the policymaker's optimization problem in each period. In particular, it is understood that the actual choice, will satisfy equation (8). Therefore, rationality entails using equation (8) in order to calculate he(Il) in equation (5). Consistency requires he(Il) = 1t. The unexpected inflation term, _he(Il), then cancels out in equation (8), which leads to the formula for the expectations function, n aa (9)
Equilibrium Policy
By the construction of the problem, a policymaker who faces the expectations given in equation (9) willbe motivated from the first-order condition of equation (8) to choose an inflation rate, that coincides with Therefore, the equilibrium involves (10) (l_k)Et..iU = ir. Since = ' U = U applies also as part of the equilibrium.
Equation (10) -12would hold automatically in every period for all choices of h() . This perspective is suggested, for example, from the analysis of macropolicy in Sargent and Wallace (1975) . In this setting the choice of the function, h(•), affects not only n, but also in each period. The independence of from is necessarily broken in the context of a once-and-for-all selection of policy functions. The condition, = n_he(Il) = 0, could then have been substituted into equation (7) . In particular, with guaranteed to move one-to-one with changes in ir, the policymaker would have regarded unemployment, U = U, as invariant with h[') Given the simple objective, from equation (3), which penalizes departures of tr from zero, the choice of h(•) that minimizes EZt for all periods would then be a variant of the constant-growth-rate-rule,8
n = h(Ii) = 0.
Note that U = obtains again as part of this solution.
Given the public's perceptions, = he(Il), U depends on the term, = -hecIl). It has been observed (Taylor (1975) , Friedman (1979) ) that the policymaker can fool the public and reduce unemployment ("temporarily") by setting > = h(I1) in period t. This 'possibility is ruled out in the case where a once-and-for-all choice of h(.) is made. However, there may be no mechanism in place to constrain the policymaker to stick to the rule, h(It1) as time evolves. This consideration leads to the setup for policy choice that has been assumed above--namely, for given initial conditions at each date, including':the expectations mechanism, = 1e(1) set n in -13order to minimize Et1Zt. The policymaker is not required to select an inflation rate to equal the given expected inflation rate. However, people also realize that the policymaker has the power to fool them at each date. Since the formation of expectations takes this potential for deception into account, a full equilibrium will ultimately involve = The crucial point is that--unlike for a once-and-for-all choice of policy rules--the policymaker does not regard = as occurring automatically for all possible choices of lTt. For this reason the (non-cooperative) equilibrium does not correspond to equation (11).
Compare the equilibrium solution, from equation (10), with the choice, = 0, that would arise from a once-and-for-all selection of policy rules.
The equilibrium solution delivers the same unemployment rate and a higher rate of inflation at each date. Therefore, the equilibrium cost, exceeds that, which would arise under the precommitted rule. (Note that, with U the same in both cases, costs end up depending only on the path of the inflation rate.) Of course, this conclusion neglects any costs of setting up or operating the different institutional environments. Notably, the costs involved in enforcing precommitments are excluded. With this cost neglected, the present type of result provides a normative argument (and positive theory?) for policy rules--that is, for precommitment on future choices of n. This aspect of the results is highlighted later.
It may be useful to demonstrate directly that = 0 is not an equilibrium for the case where the policymaker optimizes subject to given expectations in each period. Conjecture that = he(Il) = 0 holds. In this case the choice of > 0 would reduce unemployment for period t. A tradeoff arises between -14reduced costs of unemployment and increased costs from inflation. The balancing of these costs determines the chosen inflation rate, as shown in equation (8). Under the assumed conditions (marginal cost of inflation is zero at = 0 and marginal benefit from reduced unemployment is positive when U = U), the selected inflation rate will be positive. Howeve±, since people are assumed to understand this policy choice, the result > 0 is inconsistent with the conjecture that = 0. Zero inflation is not a reasonable expectation for individuals to hold.
An analogous argument can be used to find the positive rate of inflation that does provide an equilibrium. If a small positive value for had been conjectured, the policymaker would still have been motivated to select > 1T, which would be inconsistent with equilibrium. The equilibrium obtains when is sufficiently high, so that = is the policymaker's best choice, given this value of w. At this point the policymaker retains the option of choosing w. > (or < ir) so as to accomplish a tradeoff between lower unemployment and higher inflation (or vice versa). However, the level of is sufficiently high so that the marginal cost of inflation just balances the marginal gain from reducing unemployment.9 The inflation rate that corresponds to this equilibrium condition is given in equation (10).
Suppose that precommitment on policy choice is absent, so that optimization occurs on a period-by-period basis, as we have been assuming. Under this "discretionary" regime, the solution for in equation (10) constitutes a positive theory of inflation (and monetary growth). The major implications are as follows:
1) The average inflation rate exceeds the value (zero in this model) that would be optimal if policy precommitment were feasible. Therefore, an exogenous shift from a regime that involved some precommitment on nominal -15values--such as a gold standard or possibly a system with fixed exchange rates--to one without such restraints would produce a rise in the average rate of inflation (and monetary growth).
2) Within a discretionary regime, an increase in the long-run average value of the natural unemployment rate, U, raises the average rate of inflation (and monetary growth). A significant rise in is generally thought to have occurred in the U.S. over the last 10-15 years.
3) Under a discretionary policy, the inflation rate (monetary policy and aggregate demand management more generally) responds positively to the lagged unemployment rate. (The positive correlation of U1 with IJ__that is,
The rational policymaker acts countercyclically.
In a larger model it would be possible to distinguish the countercyclical response of monetary growth (which seems empirically to be important) from that of inflation--however, these two variables are directly linked in the present model. See the analysis below.
4) The extent of countercyclical response rises with a--the Phillips-• Curve slope parameter in equation (1) is analogous to advising firms to produce more output with given inputs.
Policymakers in a discretionary regime really are finding the optimal policy, subject to the applicable constraints, when they determine a countercyclical inflation/monetary reaction with positive average rates of inflation.
Monetary Growth as the Policy Instrument
We develop a simple model to illustrate some consequences of treating monetary growth, rather than inflation, as the policy instrument. Real balances held, Mt/Pti are assumed to be directly proportional to period Vs real output, which equals (1 -U) times a constant. That is, (1 -is viewed as the fraction of.a fixe4 ?!potential output" that is actually produced. Real money demanded depends inversely on expected inflation, 1T. We use the functional form, 
We treat v. as a white-noise error, which is independent of the real shock, c.
Supose that the policymaker determines the mean of monetary growth for period t as i, but the actual growth, differs from by the random error,
We treat as a white-noise error, which is independent of and Vt.
Using the expressions for Ut from equations (1) and (2) and the condition from equation (13), the inflation rate can be written as (14) t + * Vt + Ct -(l_A)Ct 1
The inflation rate equals the growth rate of money and its velocity, ÷ ÷ Vt, plus terms that measure the negative growth rate of output, Uplus a term that captures the effect on velocity of a change in expected inflation.
In particular, the current (adverse) supply shock, c, appears as a positive influence on ir• Given ir, equation (14) can be solved for ITt in the form, (adjusted monetary instrument) + (white-noise error)
The adjusted monetary instrument modifies the controlled part of money growth,, to account for the additional inflationary effects that are known and taken as given by the policymaker at the start of period t. The cost, Z, for period t is still given in equation (7) . Rather than being chosen directly by the policymaker, as it was in the original setup, there are two differences now: first, is determined indirectly by the value of the adjustment monetary instrument for period t, as noted in equation (15) , and second, can be influenced only up to the uncontrollable random term that is shown also in equation (is). If this random term were absent, the model wauld coincide with the previous framework once the substitution of the new variable, (adjusted monetary instrument). were made for ire. The solution for that is given in equation (10), together with the formula for the adjusted instrument that is shown in equation (15), would determine the value of the monetary control, Further, with the quadratic-cost structure that is assumed to hold inthepresent model, this conclusion is undisturbed by the presence of the stochastic term in equation (15). The policymaker chooses in each period so as to equate the adjusted monetary instrument for period t--and hence the policymaker's forecast for w-to the value of that is determined in equation (10).
In an equilibrium each agent who understands the policymaker's choice problem and has access to the same information set as the policymaker will derive the same inflation forecast, . Therefore, will again be part of the equilibrium. Using this fact and the form of the adjusted monetary instrument for period t, as given in equation (is), the solution for the monetary control, u, can be shown to be
The solution for Q, which also equals ir, appears in equation (10) The remaining parts of the equilibrium solution are, for actual inflation,
ITt t + (14c)U•it + v + and for the unemployment rate,
Ut z AU1 + (l-X)U" + (i.)6 -(_2_.)(R + vt).
The new influences on monetary growth in equation (16) involve the effects on inflation from anticipated output growth and changes in expected inflation.
The monetary control, ' j set so as to offset these forces in order to generate a prescribed mean value for the inflation rate, . For example, since (p + v1) temporarily raised last period's output (equation (18)), there is an expectation of lower than otherwise growth in output from date t-l to date t. Therefore, M is reduced in order to maintain the value of
The model predicts that past shocks to money or velocity will be offset in future periods.
A high value for -U") leads, through the persistence that is governed by the A-parameter, to the expectation of high output growth for period t (as well as for period t-l) . Accordingly, p is raised--this channel produces a positive reaction of monetary growth to lagged unemployment. This type of countercyclical reaction would not be matched by the inflation rate.
Last period's supply shock, 6t-l' enters into equation (16) with an apparently ambiguous sign. This effect would be positive on ut--thereby paralleling the influence of (U2 -iJ'5 --if we had assumed that the unemployment effects of inflation shocks persisted over time in the same manner as did the effects of real shocks, e. We neglected the persisting influences of inflation shocks solely for convenience (see below)
Changes in expected inflation, -.l' raise velocity. The negative response of maintains at the prescribed level. Equation (10) implies that ttl depends positively on last period's supply shock, tl' and negatively on (Ut 2 -U").
Equation (17) 
Some other Extensions
The model could be modified to allow effects from inflation shocks to persist over time--that is, equation (1) could be modified to allow Ut to depend on current and lagged values of (w -lTe). This extension complicates the policymaker's first-order condition in equation (8) to include effects on a distributed lead of prospective future values of unemployment and inflation.
The ultimate equilibrium is altered in that expected future values of U and it appear as influences on in equation (10) The magnitude pf change in the inflation rate could be included as an additional argument of the cost function in equation (3). For example, the term, c(lT_wl)2l where c > 0, could be added to the expression for This element might capture the costs for the economy to adapt to a different inflationary environment. The policyniaker's choice of then becomes a dynamic problem. The model would describe a transition path between a given initial inflation rate and a steady-state (mean) inflation rate. The overall nature of the results would not change from that discussed earlier.
-22-
Revenue from Money Creation
A substantial literature (e.g. Bailey, 1956 , Aueniheimer, 1974 , Calvo, 1978 considers the outcomes when the government attempts to maximize the (present value of) revenue from paper money creation. This problem is reasonably straightforward if the government can precomniit its course of future monetary actions. The solution is the one described by Auernheimer (1974) , where the usual monopoly formula arises. However, when choices of monetary growth cannot be precoinmitted and the private sector forms expectations rationally, taking account of the government's revenue objective, Calvo (1978) has shown that a dynamic inconsistency arises. Given inflationary expectations at each date, the government can generate more revenue if it chooses a.. higher than anticipated rate of monetary expansion. Since the private sector is assumed to understand the government's objective, they will anticipate this outcome. Therefore, the prior expectations on money growth and inflation are revised accordingly. But, the government can then choose a higher rate of monetary expansion, and so on. Without prior restraints, the government's period-by-period optimization entails a higher-than expected--possibly infinite--rate of monetary growth. There is no equilibrium because the systematic surprises implied by this behavior are inconsistent with rationality on the part of money holders.
This dilemma disappears if the inflation rate enters the government's objective function as a cost element. For example, suppose that the policymaker's objective entails minimization of costs, as given by (19) = Z(R ¶Tt) -23where Rt p-od t's real revenue from.money creation. It is assumed that 3Z/3R < 0 and > 0--that is, rises in revenue are viSed as a benefit item. These preferences could reflect society's desire to raise a given total revenue at minimal deadweight loss. A larger value for implies less revenue raised by other methods of (distorting) taxation.
Real revenue from money creation is generated by a function of the form, (20) = R(, ¶-li:.
For simplicity, we do not distinguish between the inflation rate and the monetary growth rate in this formulation. Without precommitment and with treated as given for each, period, the policymaker recognizes that Rt can be. raised by generating inflation in excess of expectations. The setting, is no longer an equilibrium because of this possibility. Rather, the policymaker will choose ir. Under ratiotal expectations this outcome would be anticipated, so that and are both higher--that is, the (wt -r) term in the R-function of equation (20) The nature of this equilibrium corresponds to that in the previous example where the unemployment rate substituted for revenue, R, in the policymaker's objective function. In both cases the driving element is the impact of unexpected inflation, which is negative on Ut and positive on Rt.
Government Bonds
Besides the direct revenue from money creation, inflation has additional dynamic effects on government receipts. We consider here the example of -26-
Reputational Equilibria
A different form of equilibrium may emerge in which the policyinaker foregoes short-term gains for the sake of maintaining a long-term "reputation." Consider again the initial setting where costs depend on unemployment and inflation, as in equation (3). The "rules equilibrium" generates U = U and iTt = 0, while the non-cooperative, period-by-period solution yields the inferior outcome, U = U and = 0.
Another possible form of solution, which has been discussed in the related game-theory literature (e.g. in Friedman, 1971) , takes the following form. Private agents anticipate the cooperative result, = 0, unless they have seen something else. Once observing a different value for inflation, agents henceforth expect the non-cooperative policy, ir =
16
Confronted by this behavior, the policymaker has two options: first, 'l = l can be chosen in period one.
In conjunction with the initial expectation, w = 0, the choice of iT1
generates a favorable first-period tradeoff between low unemployment, Li1 < 1J, and high inflation. For the first period this outcome is preferred to the rules solution, where U1 = (J and = 0. In subsequent periods individuals would set = and the policymaker selects = as the best possible response, given these expectations. Therefore, the noncooperative equilibrium, Ut = U and = ' arises from period 2 onward.
The policymaker's second option is to set = 0 in each period. Since = 0 is sustained under this policy, the coopexative solution, Ut = and = 0, obtains in all periods. Under this option the policymaker foregoes the hypothetical short-run gain in order to sustain "credibility" and thereby enjoy the benefits of future cooperative outcomes.
-27-Prom the policynaker's viewpoint the central new feature is the linkage between current policy choices and subsequent inflationary expectations.
In particular, the policymaker knows that = 0 will apply only if = 0 has been set for all i > 0--that is, at all previous dates. Whether the reputational equilibrium will arise depends on the policymaker's weighing of the benefits from the two possible modes of behavior. The first optiop would be preferred if the hypothetical one-period benefit from low unemployment outweighs the present value of the losses from higher inflation in future 17 periods.
There are many features that can cause the reputational equilibrium to break down. First, any known, finite horizon for the game rules out these types of equilibria. The cooperative solution is clearly non-sustainable in the final period--working backward, period-by-period, this breakdown can be shown to be transmitted to all earlier periods.18 However, if the game ends only probabilistically, the reputational equilibrium might be sustainable. A higher probability of termination effectively raises the discount rate that is applicable to outcomes in future periods. This higher discount rate lowers the benefits from long-term reputation (low inflation) relative to those from short-run gains (low unemployment). Accordingly, while a finite expected horizon for the game does not make the reputational equilibrium impossible, it does make it more difficult to maintain.
Second, at least the simple form of cooperation is lost if option one becomes preferable to option two during any period. In the present example, a runup in the natural unemployment rate could make the hypothetical short-run benefit from reduced unemployment exceed the present value of losses from higher future inflation.
-28-Third, in a context of partial information, agents may have difficulty verifying the underlying monetary policy (such as the value of in the example discussed above in Section 2) . Some form of stochastic decision rule would have to be implemented. Policymakers would have a corresponding incentive to cheat--such situations would be characterized by claims that inflation and/or monetary growth was not caused by past governmental actions.
Similarly, policymakers would desire to proclaim the end of a previous regime that involved excessive inflation in order to restore matters to the "first period" in which = 0 was based on trust, rather than on performance.
The essential problem is the lack of an objective link between current actions, and future expectations, 1r+.. An enforced rule ties actual and anticipated values together. In this sense the reputational equilibrium amounts to a fragile approximation to the rules equilibrium. Despite the apparent difficulties with sustaining reputational equilibria, casual observation suggests that reputational forces, unreinforced by formal rules, can generate satisfactory outcomes in some areas. Further investigation seems warranted into the factors that allow reputational equilibria to be sustained.
Rules versus Discretion Once Again
The presence or absence of precommitment coincides with the meaningful distinction between rules and discretion. It is useful to eliminate two common, but irrelevant, distinctions between rules and discretion that have arisen in previous literature: 1) Policy is described by a once-and-for-all choice of reaction function, h(I1). but discretion allows ttl to encompass a larger set of arguments than does a (simple) rule. This viewpoint makes rules look like a silly constraint on the options of the policymaker. From this perspective, rules are defensible only if the policymaker is incompetent or nontrustworthy, in the sense of using an inappropriate objective.
2) Ignorance about the workings of the economy favors a simple rule for policy.
-While this outcome is possible, the conclusion is not general.
It is readily imaginable that uncertainty about variables or about model structure would magnify the number of factors to which feedback was justified.
The meaningful dimension of a rule is its capacity to precommit the manner in which future policy choices will be determined. In many private arrangements, as with governmental policies, efficiency requires the potential for advance commitments--that is, for contractural obligations. Kydland and Prescott (1977) describe numerous public policy areas in which formal or implicit ex ante constraints on future actions are important, including patents, flood plain projects, and energy investments. Other areas include repudiation of national debt and taxation of capital income generally. Actual methods for framing government policies seem to be successful to different degrees in each case.
In the unemployment/inflation example the outcome is sub-optimal relative to that generated by a policy rule, if the costs of erecting and enforcing the rules are disregarded. The "optimal" solution, = 0 and T.J = U, is then attainable through a (costlessly-operating) mechanism that restricts future governmental actions on inflation. Under a discretionary regime, the policymaker faces an unemployment/inflation tradeoff at each date and performs accordingly. The policymaker does as well for the public as possible within an environment where precommitments--that is, long-term contracts with the public--are precluded. Rather than rules being less flexible than discretion, the situation is reversed. Discretion amounts to disallowing a set of long-term arrangements between the policymaker and the-public. Purely discretionary policies are the sub-set of rules that involve no guarantees about the government's future behavior!9
Monetary Institutions and Policy Choice
The spirit of this paper is to characterize monetary growth and inflation as reflections of optimal public policy within a given institutional setup.
Under a discretionary regime, the policymaker performs optimally subject to an assumed inability to preconiinit future actions. The framework assumes rationality in terms of the day-to-day actions that are carried out repeatedly within the given institutional mode. The intention here is to model the regular behavior of a monetary authority, such as the Federal Reserve. We are less comfortable about specifying frutiful approaches for framing positive theories of monetary institutions.20 If we had retained the optimality criterion that we utilized for analyzing day-to-day monetary actions, and if we had assumed that the costs of implementing and enforcing monetary rules were small, then discretionary monetary policy would not be observed. Within the natural-rate setting of our model, a positive theory might predict the selection of a rule (or its equivalent) --and the establishment of an accompanying enforcement apparatus--that would guarantee low and relatively stable rates of inflation. But, we have abstracted completely from the evolution of economic theory and its place as a research and development tool for designing policy institutions. Thus, we simply do not address the source of technological change in the "production" of policy.
Presumably, the substantial setup costs that are associated with erecting monetary or other institutions mean that changes in regime will be observed only infrequently. The relatively small experience with alternatives suggests-unlike for the case of regular operations within a given regime--the potential for substantial, persisting errors. Although we would be uncomfortable attempting to forecast a systematic direction of error in future institutional choices, we might be willing to label a particular past choice--such as the movement away from the remnants of the gold standard and fixed exchange rates--as a mistake.
The distinction between institutional choice and operating decisions within a given regime relates also to the economist's role as a policy adviser. In our model the economist has no useful day-to-day advice to 
Footnotes
LThe model that we consider is sufficiently simple to allow for unanimity about desirable governmental actions.
2Many people respond with a willingness to view public policy as irrational.
Despite the obvious attractions of this viewpoint, it does leave one without a theory of systematic governmental behavior. An earlier attempted reconciliation with rationality (Barro, 1977, .p. 104 ) was based on public finance consIderations associated with cyclical changes in the revenue obtained frOm printing money. This avenue appears to be quantitatively insufficient to explain the facts about countercyclical monetary response. However, the revenue motive for money creation would be important in some extreme cases.
For example, see Hercowitz (1981) for an analysis of monetary behavior and government spending during the German hyperinflation.
3The prior expectation of inflation for period t could be distinguished from the expectation that is conditioned on partial information about current prices. This distinction arises in models, such s Lucas (1972 Lucas ( , 1973 -and Barro (1976) (11) corresponds to Kydland and Prescott's "optimal" solution (1977, p. 480) . They contrast this outcome from policy rules with a "timeconsistent," but less desirable result, which corresponds to our equation (10) 9Consider UOne is tempted to say that setting n in equation (10) 13The result is not fully cooperative because of the underlying externality that makes the natural unemployment rate "too high."
lOThe reaction can be modified so that = applies only for a finite time period. However, a shorter "punishment interval" makes it more difficult to induce the policymaker to opt for the cooperative result. an infinite horizon for the problem (see below), a sufficiently high value of within this interval must make option two preferable to option one.
However, the admissàble range for would depend on the realizations for n U and other variables. 18 Some attempts to avoid this conclusion in analogous contexts have been explored in Kreps and Wilson (1980) and Radner (1979), et. al. 191f the desirability of precommitments on monetary growth and inflation is accepted, there are numerous procedures within the present model that can generate outcomes that are equivalent to those produced by a once-and-for-all choice of rules. For example, discretion could be maintained, but the parameters of the policymaker's preferences could be artificially manipulated in order to generate anon-cooperative solution where = 0. This result follows if the policyinaker gives infinite weight to inflation (b = o), zero weight to unemployment (a = 0), or regards the natural unemployment rate as optimal (k = 1). In the context of discretionary policy, outcomes may improve if there is a divergence in preferences between the principal (society) and
its agent (the policymaker) -37-2rhe distinction between choices of institutions and selections of policies within a given regime parallels Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) dichotomy between decisions at the constitutional and operating levels of government. Buchanan (1962) stresses the importance of the constitutional perspective in designing a satisfactory monetary/inflation policy. 21 Perhaps this observation accounts for the Federal Reserve's attitude toward the unsolicited advice that is provided to it by economists. The Federal Reserve appears interested mostly in "efficient" operation within a given policy regime--specifically, on what to do "right now." Although many economists offer advice of this sort, there is little reason to believe that these suggestions would improve on the Fed's period-by-period optimization.
More recently, much of economists' advice to the Fed has amounted to proposals for altering the underlying "rules of the game." It is likely that the Federal
Reserve is powerless to utilize these types of constitutional-like suggestions.
